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We wish to thank Alessandro Sapio for the very useful and stimulating comments. Two interesting points are raised by the analysis of Sapio.
First, He suggests that the assumption of fully rational, autarkic agents can be misleading in view of growing experimental evidence on the role played by social norms and reciprocity in human behavior. In particular, it is likely that, as, e.g., in Cantono and Silverberg (2009) , consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for green products is affected by the WTPs of their neighbors. Including peer effects in consumption would certainly have relevant implications for our analysis giving an active role both to local (i.e. spatial) and aggregate income inequality. The spatial distribution of agents endowed with different income levels would affect the distribution of preferences for a given aggregate level of inequality.
In spite of its relevance, this extension would deliver quite intuitive implications. Consider, for sake of simplicity, two populations characterized by the same level of aggregate inequality and different levels of segregation by incomes, which is here a sufficient statistics for broader socio-economic conditions. It is clear then that the first population would display a stronger pioneer consumer effect, while the second a larger mass of potential adopters, i.e. larger market size effect. From a purely theoretical perspective, all our results for technology diffusion apply to this more general case. Relevant implications would emerge, instead, by allowing the government to intervene in both the sorting process and in the determination of the income distribution. However, such analysis would lack realism: policies explicitly affecting sorting are not feasible in market economies where the house market determines the level of segregation.
Finally, the empirical evidence in support of peer effects in consumption is still scant, see footnote 4 in the paper, so this assump-tion would be difficult to justify. In turn, including other behavioral assumptions that are empirically observable, i.e. altruistic agents are more willing to buy green goods, would add realism without adding further insights. Indeed, binding income constraints prevent the consumption of the green good of those 'environmentalists' with low incomes.
The second comment regards the way in which we model the supply side that, we agree, is over-simplified. Including heterogeneous firm in our analysis would allow to study the joint effect of environmental and industrial policies. This extension will also be more in the spirit of recent theoretical analysis of the effect of environmental policies (i.e. Acemoglu et al. 2010, Fisher and Newell 2009) . We found particularly interesting the possibility of including firm dynamics in a context of (truly dynamic) endogenous policy determination as the one suggested by Sapio. Such structure will allow us to analyze the crucial question of the co-evolution of technology and policy, as we believe ABM models would be the most suitable tool to analyse this interesting issue.
Moreover, considering the policy game behind the determination of environmental policies has also a strong empirical motivation. In the energy sector, for instance, there is a large and growing case study and empirical evidence showing the opposition of exiting incumbents against the approval of ambitious renewable energy policies (e.g. Jacobsson and Bergek 2004 , Nilsson et al. 2004 , Lauber and Mez 2004 , Nicolli and Vona 2012 , that stimulate innovation (Johnstone et al. 2010) . The reason of this opposition is that renewable energy production is partially decentralized and hence destructive for the centralized model of energy production that ensures high profit to electric utility. The same argument applies for the link between the large distribution of food and the intensive, very polluting, methods of food production. A possible extension with heterogeneous firms can consider the complementarities between entry barriers and environmental policies. For instance, reducing the entry will reinforce green innovators and increases the lobbying effort in favour of ambitious environmental policies.
